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Can Blogging and Employment Co-Exist?
By JOHN S. HONG*
SUPPOSE RACHEL JONES, a hypothetical employee at a midsized
newspaper, writes the following entry on her personal Web log':
I really hate clowns. Seriously. Okay, first off. They have these stu-
pid little tricks that they do to thrill little kids. Then they have that
evil-looking make-up that gives me nightmares. They run around
laughing like complete morons and then charge you an arm and a
leg for a couple of hours of complete torture.
Jones's supervisor finds the entry during her weekly Friday ritual
of reading through her employees's Web logs. The supervisor's hus-
band happens to be the clown that worked the party Jones threw for
her children. The day after that posting, Jones is fired.
The fairness of terminating Jones's employment is debatable.
Jones's supervisor may genuinely perceive the Web log-or "blog," as
it is more commonly known-entry as a personal insult against her
and her family. If Jones's co-workers commonly read the blog and
know of the supervisor's affinity for clowns, this "personal insult"
might have a detrimental effect on company morale, hurting the com-
pany's bottom line. On the other hand, Jones's entry does not deal at
all with the newspaper's business interests. It is merely a personal rant
regarding off-duty activities that does not in the least pertain to the
news. So what rights does an employee, such as Jones, have when fired
for an off-duty blog posting that does not pertain to her employer's
business interests or other legitimate business needs?
* Class of 2007; B.A., Davidson College, 1999; Managing Editor, U.S.F. Law Review,
Volume 41. I would like to thank my fiancee, Michelle, and my parents for encouraging
and supporting my legal education. I would also like to thank Professor Maria L. Ontiveros
who provided me the edits to make this piece suitable for publication. Lastly, I would like
to thank my editor, Melissa Brown, for her hard work in preparing this Comment for
publication.
1. See infta note 3 and accompanying text for the definition of Web log.
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Current employment-related statutory schemes insufficiently ad-
dress off-duty activities, leaving bloggers (the term applied to those
who maintain blogs) vulnerable to unwarranted adverse employment
actions by their employer. The development and increased use of the
Internet has established an entirely new medium of communication.
Yet, the existing legal framework has failed to keep up with this bur-
geoning technology. An employer's unbridled ability to regulate an
employee's online communication 2 arguably violates a privacy right so
far as that regulation affects the employee's sense of autonomy. This
Comment explores the extent to which a blogger who exercises this
autonomy right, by publishing thoughts or opinions online, should
legitimately fear termination or other retaliatory actions by the snoop-
ing employer.
The employer's duty to respect the basic privacy rights of employ-
ees makes up only half the equation, however. With this new means of
communication comes a responsibility for discretion by the employee.
After all, an employer should not have to tolerate an employee re-
vealing company secrets or badmouthing the company's product on a
personal blog. Employment law must draw a line between these mana-
gerial rights of the employer and the privacy rights of the employee.
Part I introduces the technology of blogging and its pervasive na-
ture in society today as a means of communication. The section dis-
cusses the implication of blogging to employees, who must contend
not only with the invasion of their autonomy by their employers but
also the risk of adverse employment actions by an employer who dis-
likes the contents of the blogger's publication. The section then ad-
dresses the employer's concern with blogging and the impact of such
publications on the business interests of employers.
In light of the need for balance between the countervailing inter-
ests of employers and employees, Part II proposes a model state stat-
ute that substantively protects the rights of bloggers while keeping in
mind the business interests of employers. Part II then discusses cur-
rent state statutory schemes that address off-duty blogging by employ-
ees, concluding that these laws insufficiently address off-duty conduct
in light of recent technological advances that have made online com-
munication commonplace in our society. Part II argues that state stat-
utory schemes, although currently insufficient, address privacy
2. See David R. Marshall, Bloggers in the Workplace: "They're Here! ; EDWARDS & ANGELL
LLP LAB. & EMP. BULL., Summer 2005, at 1, available at http://www.eapdlaw.com/files/
News/9f42d58a-a149-4c89-bc35-OOOe864cal cl /Presentation/NewsAttachment/538a99db-
76f9-45e6-adf4-02106fbd8359/L%26E-summerO5.pdf.
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concerns better than protection evolved through common law or im-
plemented through federal legislation. Finally, Part II urges the state
legislatures to pass laws, such as the proposed model statute, that rea-
sonably protect the autonomy of employees and their lifestyle choices
in the context of blogging.
I. Privacy Implications of Blogging for the Employee and the
Employer
Blogs are the latest trend to explode onto the cyberspace scene.
Blogs have traditionally been used for two functions: (1) as an online
diary, in which the author chronicles a log of thoughts; and (2) as a
personal Web site that provides updated headlines and news articles
of other sites that are of interest to the user, which may also include
journal entries, commentaries, and recommendations compiled by
the user.3 Millions of workers, perhaps as much as five percent of the
United States work force, maintain blogs; yet, only about fifteen per-
cent of employers have specific policies addressing work-related blog-
ging.4 Employee blogs inevitably raise employment concerns akin to
the issues raised by emails and Internet usage, such as workplace
discipline.5
A. The Technology
In December 1997, Jorn Barger introduced the term, "Web log,"
which today is commonly known as a "blog.''6 People use the terms
"Web log" and "blog" interchangeably.7 "Weblogger" and "blogger"
refer to the person who creates or authors a blog.8 Blogs emerged as a
way for technically-savvy individuals to help others unearth useful In-
ternet sites by listing websites visited by the writer in chronological
order and occasionally including a line or two of commentary about
those sites. These comments would guide a reader to favored sites
3. 0.9.6 WEBSTER'S NEW MILLENNIUM DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH, PREVIEW EDITION (Lex-
ico Publishing Group, LLC), http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/blogosphere (last
visited Jan. 19, 2007).
4. Steve Hirschfeld, Blogging and the American Workplace, ELA NEWS RooM, Feb. 6,
2006, http://fm.employmentlawalliance.com/ela/FMPro?search=blogging+and+the+
American+Workplace&-Find=Search&-max=200&-Db=elaarticles.fp5&-Find=&-Layout=
web&-Format=articlelist.html.
5. See LITTLER MENDELSON, THE NATIONAL EMPLOYER 1274 (2006).
6. Rebecca Blood, Weblogs: A History and Perspective, REBECCA'S POCKET, Sept. 7, 2000,
http://www.rebeccablood.net/essays/weblog-history.html.
7. See id.
8. See id.
Winter 2007]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
more pointedly than traditional search engines. 9 Viewers appreciated
this guidance in the early days of the Internet, when high-speed access
was practically inaccessible and users paid an hourly fee for browsing
via dial-up. Visiting these blogs allowed people to avoid spending time
aimlessly surfing the Internet.10
Blogging has evolved since its early days and links are no longer
the primary focus of the sites. The usual line or two of commentary
has become paragraphs and pages of ideas, events, or opinions of the
author. Blogging has become a popular form of online expression t"
and has attracted the entire spectrum of Internet users. No typical
blogger exists; bloggers range from high school students discussing
breakups with their sweethearts, 12 to an owner of an NBA franchise
giving his blog-readers information about his personal investments. 13
Blog use has skyrocketed in recent years, more so even within the
last year. In the summer of 2005, the Internet hosted an estimated
thirty-two million blogs.14 As of November 2006, that number had sur-
passed fifty-five million. 15
The popularity of blogging increased dramatically after Andrew
Smales, a programmer in Toronto, launched the first do-it-yourself
Web log tool-Pitas.com-in July of 1999.16 Pitas.com made knowl-
edge of programming languages, such as HTML, unnecessary. 17 Now,
ease of use makes it possible for anyone who has access to a computer
and the Internet to blog.18 Bloggers no longer have to rely on an in-
9. See Gregory Boyd Bell, Blogs Here, Blogs There, HAMILTON SPECrATOR, Aug. 31, 2002,
at M13.
10. See id.
11. Marshall, supra note 2, at 1.
12. Xanga.com, Blog of NIGHTROCKER014, July 26, 2006, http://www.xanga.com/
nightrocker014.
13. Blogmaverick.com, Blog of Mark Cuban, Nov. 15, 2006, http://www.blog
maverick.com.
14. Marshall, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that a study conducted by Perseus Develop-
ment Corporation found that among the top twenty Web log service providers, there were
31.6 million user accounts).
15. Leslie D'Monte, Blogging Acquires Corporate Hue, REDIFF NEWS, Nov. 15, 2006,
http://inhome.rediff.com/money/2006/nov/15blog.htm.
16. Mallory Jensen, A Brief History of Weblogs, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Sept.-Oct.
2003, at 22.
17. See id.
18. The author of this Comment-in spite of his limited computer-programming ex-
perience-accessed a blog site, setup his own blog, and published an opinion within a
matter of minutes on the Internet. Blogging is a technological endeavor that is unique and
separate from traditional web pages. Bloggers do not need to know any computer lan-
guages to publish, like C++ or JAVA. Bloggers do not even need to learn FrontPage to
publish on a blog site.
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termediary to publish online, like a webmaster, system administrator,
or a web content manager. By following simple directions and clicking
the requisite buttons, a blogger can publish any idea or opinion
within seconds. Bloggers can also blog ad nauseam, publishing some-
thing every minute, day, or week. No one monitors or censors the
contents of blog sites.
B. Employee-Employer Concerns at the Intersection of
Employment and Online Communication
The explosion of blog ownership and readership affects the
world of employment in many ways. In certain industries, employers
encourage blogging. Some corporate executives embrace blogging as
a medium to communicate with their employees or as a brand-build-
ing technique for current and potential clients and customers.1 9 For
example, Sun Microsystems maintains its own blog site that is utilized
by 1300 of Sun's employees, including the company president,
Jonathan Schwartz. 20 In response to Mr. Schwartz's request to use
blogs to communicate with investors, the chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, Christopher Cox, posted a comment on
Mr. Schwartz's blog, stating: "I thought you might appreciate my tak-
ing advantage of the Internet's speed and potential for broad dissemi-
nation by posting here [on Jonathan's blog] as well . . . . The
Commission encourages the use of websites as a source of information
to the market and investors .... "21
In many other industries, employers have discouraged blog-
ging-and for good reason. Employers may reasonably assume that
loose-lipped employees will talk about company secrets or simply give
negative publicity to the company. Searching "fired for blogging" on
Google yields thousands of results, including personal anecdotes on
actual terminations, recommendations for employer policies on blog-
ging, and news articles on terminations based on the contents of an
employee's blog site. In fact, such terminations have become so com-
monplace that Internet vernacular supplies a term for this situation:
19. See Press Release, Makovsky & Company, Fortune 1000 Senior Executives Slow to
React to the Growing Credibility of Corporate Blogs, New Survey Concludes, May 3, 2006,
available at http://www.makovsky.com/mak/pdf/press/2006-05-O3MakovskyStateOfCorpo-
rateBloggingSurvey.pdf.
20. Sun Microsystems Employee Blogs, http://www.blogs.sun.com/roller/main.do
(last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
21. D'Monte, supra note 15.
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"dooced," which means "getting fired because of something that you
wrote in your weblog." 22
1. Risks to Employee Bloggers
Employees put their jobs on the line when they write publicly, so
blogging employees must be aware of the type of behavior that can
trigger a negative response from the employer. Because blogging is no
longer a technologically-advanced endeavor, ill thoughts or criticisms
that would have only been shared in private conversation in the past
are now easily published online where they are read and shared by a
large Internet community. The increased ease of use and lower bar-
rier to reaching the online public has created the need for bloggers to
use discretion when publishing-discretion that the employer may
feel is underutilized. The employers in the three situations detailed
below felt that their blogging employees underutilized such discre-
tion, leaving them with no option but to fire the bloggers.
a. Bloggers Beware: Terminations for Blogging Abound
Bloggers have not only suffered legal consequences, 23 but have
lost their jobs due to their online activities. Some of these termina-
tions have occurred when the employee blogged directly about their
employment. For example, in July 2002, the Houston Chronicle
("Chronicle") fired reporter Steve Olafson. 24 Under the pseudonym
Banjo Jones, Olafson maintained the Brazosport News, a personal
blog covering various subjects, including his family and local polit-
ics. 25 His blog's political commentary discussed the very topics and
individuals about which the Chronicle paid Olafson to cover as a re-
porter.26 Never informed by Olafson of the blogsite, the Chronicle
editors remained unaware of its existence until a reporter from an-
other local paper contacted them, complaining that Olafson had criti-
22. MACMILLAN ENGLISH DICTIONARY, DOOCED, http://www.macmillandictionary.
com/New-Words/050131-dooced.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
23. A blogger may find him/herself as the defendant in a lawsuit. See Batzel v. Smith,
333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (implying that a blogger may not be liable for libelous state-
ments made by another and added to a blog, but not that direct libel is outside the scope
of consequences for indiscriminate bloggers); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe:
Defamation &Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 919-44 (2000) (stating that when a
blogger writes what he believes is an opinion, courts may find it to be a statement of fact
instead and, therefore, be open to a possible libel judgment).
24. Richard Connelly, Banjo Blues, HOUSTON PRESS ONLINE, Aug. 8, 2002, http://www.
houstonpress.com/Issues/2002-08-08/news/hostage.html.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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cized him on the site. 27 The Chronicle editors asked Olafson to take
down his site. They criticized his "gonzo journalism" and were angry
that he had created material that they perceived to be harmful to the
newspaper's reputation.28 The newspaper suspended Olafson for a
week and then permanently terminated his employment. 29
Other companies have fired employees for conduct loosely re-
lated to their employment. In October 2004, Delta Air Lines ("Delta
Air") fired a flight attendant, Ellen Simonetti, because of the content
of her blog.30 The blog anonymously chronicled her life, including
her work as a flight attendant.31 Simonetti made sure to keep the writ-
ing and pictures anonymous, referring to her employer as "Anony-
mous Airlines," the city in which she was based as "Quirksville," and
herself as "Queen of the Sky."'32 In fact, a large part of the blog con-
tained fictional stories because Queen of the Sky developed into a
character in her own right, apart from Simonetti's actual experiences
at Delta Air.3 3 The airline reviewed her blog photos showing her in a
Delta Air Lines uniform aboard a plane and revealing the lace of her
brassiere as well as her thighs. 34 On September 25, 2004, in response
to these pictures, the airline suspended Simonetti indefinitely. 35 A
month later, Delta Air terminated her employment. 36
Companies have also fired employees for conduct wholly unre-
lated to their employment. Programmer Mark Pilgrim was fired after
his manager followed a link on one of the company websites (a web-
site that Pilgrim created) to Pilgrim's personal blog and discovered an
essay reflecting on his past addictions to nicotine, alcohol, and mari-
juana.37 Pilgrim had already overcome his addictions and the sub-
stances posed no threat to his work productivity, but the manager
demanded that Pilgrim completely abandon the personal blog.3 8 Pil-
grim offered to compromise by removing the link from the company
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Diary of a Fired Flight Attendant, Dec. 21, 2004, http://queenof-
sky.journalspace.com/.
31. Jo Twist, Blogger Grounded by Her Airline, BBC NEws, available at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3955913.stm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Diary of a Fired Flight Attendant, supra note 30.
35. Twist, supra note 31.
36. Diary of a Fired Flight Attendant, supra note 30.
37. Paul S. Gutman, Say What? Blogging and Employment Law in Conflict, 27 COLUM. J.L.
& ARrs 145, 148 (2003).
38. Id.
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website to his personal blog.39 The manager rejected the compromise
and insisted that Pilgrim take down the site.40 Pilgrim refused, and he
posted his resume on the blogsite in anticipation of losing his job.41
Viewing the resume post as insubordination, the manager fired
Pilgrim. 42
The anecdotal evidence above suggests, at the very least, that em-
ployers are using the contents of their employees's blogs to make em-
ployment decisions, sometimes to the detriment of the employee.
Blogging's popularity is so prevalent that it can now be safely consid-
ered "a key part of online culture,"4 3 a culture that involves millions of
participants. Employees's blogging activities should, therefore, enjoy
some measure of protection, based on their right to privacy in non-
work related matters.
b. Bloggers Beware: The Privacy Right to Autonomy at Risk
There is an inherent contradiction in recognizing the protection
of privacy for blogging. The publication of a blog for the entire In-
ternet community to read is, by default, a public endeavor. So, how
can a blogger reasonably seek privacy protection for communicating
openly on the Web? The answer may lay in a closer look at the role
blogging plays in the daily lives of many Web users. The concept of
privacy discussed herein does not rely on the four types of harmful
activities typically redressed by the laws seeking to protect privacy.44
Instead, this discussion of privacy relates to another activity recently
gaining ground as a basis for protection under the umbrella of privacy
actions: the protection of autonomy in choosing one's own lifestyle.
45
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 149.
42. Id.
43. PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, THE STATE OF BLOGGING (Jan. 2005),
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP blogging-data.pdf.
44. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960) (identifying the
four types of activities as (1) the intrusion upon the seclusion or solitude, or into the
plaintiff's affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; (3) publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of the plaintiffs
name or likeness by the defendant for an advantage).
45. See Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-examining Appear-
ance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REv. 1111 (2006) (discussing the protec-
tion of autonomy of employees for their freedom of choice in dress); Rafael Gely &
Leonard Bierman, Workplace Blogs and Workers'Privay, 66 LA. L. REv. 1079 (2006) (discuss-
ing the protection of autonomy of employees blogging during their off-duty time); Pauline
T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671
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The explosion of the blogosphere, 46 and technology in general,
has opened a new door through which the employer is now capable of
intrusively and surreptitiously managing the employee. The large
number of bloggers demonstrates that people are communicating on-
line as commonly as, if not more than, through print and in person
(consider online dating, for instance). Blogging, as a new medium of
communication, has been used more extensively in recent years partly
due to the fact that anyone, including employers, can easily access it.
Yet it does not necessarily follow that because people now use this new
tool to increase communication, an employer should have the in-
creased right to monitor an employee's off-duty conduct with this
tool. Unfortunately for bloggers, however, no restrictions on this type
of monitoring exist. The law has yet to address the privacy complica-
tions that result from this technological development.
Privacy, which is universally recognized as a fundamentally impor-
tant value, 47 loses out to employers's interests where the law fails to
provide protections. What employees do outside the workplace, inde-
pendent and unrelated to the job, is their own business, not the busi-
ness of the employer. Off-duty conduct, therefore, should not serve as
the basis for an adverse employment action. This idea links closely to
basic notions of privacy and the right to individual autonomy.
There is literature that gives credence to the idea that the right to
privacy is powerful enough to serve as the basis for the protection of
off-duty conduct by the employee. Professor Pauline Kim, for exam-
ple, argues that the principle of privacy rights, having found its way
into constitutional jurisprudence, 48 should transcend even the at-will
employment presumption because "[p]rivacy is an essential part of
the complex social practice by means of which the social group recog-
nizes-and communicates to the individual-that his existence is his
own."4 9 "An invasion of privacy, then, is intrinsically harmful because
it entails the denial of basic forms of respect accorded members of the
community."50 Since an extensive backdrop of social norms, which in-
(1996) (discussing the conflict between employee privacy interests and the at-will employ-
ment doctrine).
46. "Blogosphere" is the collective term encompassing all blogs as a community or
social network. 0.9.6 WEBSTER'S NEW MILLENNIUM DIcrIONARY, supra note 3, http://diction-
ary.reference.com/browse/blogosphere (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
47. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
48. Kim, supra note 45, at 683.
49. Id. at 691 (citingJeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 26, 39 (1976)).
50. Id. at 694.
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cludes legitimate privacy expectations, inevitably plays a role in the
creation of an employment relationship, employees must be afforded
those privacy expectations in the employment setting.51
These expectations should be reasonably limited, however. Pro-
fessor Kim acknowledges that because employers and employees en-
gage in a joint effort to achieve common business ends, employees
must relinquish certain claims to privacy they would otherwise enjoy
against the world-at-large.5 2 But because the employment relationship
is for a specific, limited purpose, any relinquishment must be limited
to the achievement of that business purpose. 53 In other words, "em-
ployer intrusions [into an employee's core privacy rights] should not
be permitted unless essential to meet some business need. '54
In another similarly-related context, Professor Catherine Fisk ad-
vocates the notion of autonomy as a means of protecting the individ-
ual's right to dress in the work environment as he or she sees fit, so
long as that appearance does not offend a legitimate employer inter-
est. "[A] robust right of privacy ... could be extended to cover the
autonomy right of employees to choose their appearance absent some
legitimate employer justification .... I am not.., willing to sacrifice
the autonomy rights of [the] nonreligious [sic] to dress in the way
that is important to them."5 5 In spite of the fact that dress at work is,
like blogging, inherently public, Professor Fisk believes that protec-
tion of the employee's choice in dress belongs under the ambit of
privacy.
The term, a "right of privacy," is a misnomer. Privacy protects all
sorts of behavior that are not necessarily hidden from view; it protects
a boundary between the self and the world or between one's personal
life and one's work life. "As many have observed, privacy should be
about autonomy, rather than secrecy. '5 6
Justification for autonomy in off-duty blogging is very similar to
justification for autonomy in dress: neither implicates secrecy or intru-
sions therein. Yet, there is a clear privacy intrusion on unwitting em-
ployees who communicate online and get fired for the blog entry the
next day. Thus, the law should afford off-duty bloggers privacy protec-
tion from adverse employment actions. That protection, however, can-
51. Id. at 698.
52. Id. at 702.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Fisk, supra note 45, at 1127-28.
56. Id. at 1139.
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not ignore and must be balanced with the protection of employers's
rights.
2. Employers Have the Right to Manage Their Employees
Employers have many legitimate concerns when it comes to the
blogging activities of employees. Bloggers often fail to appreciate the
power of blogs to communicate with millions of Internet users. 57 Em-
ployers may feel it is their right to have access to information about
their employees' online conduct because certain behavior can subject
them to liability.
Because of the doctrine of respondeat superior,58 an employer
must be concerned about its employees engaging in tortious or even
criminal behavior. Tort liability could extend to the employer who
does not exercise proper control or whose neglect made the activity
possible. One type of tortious behavior, for example, is
discrimination.
The following two cases illustrate how comments made by em-
ployees on blog sites may be admissible in a discrimination case. First,
in Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc.,59 an employee sued an employer for
age discrimination. 60 The employee offered two off-duty verbal state-
ments allegedly made by the president of Carmike to support his dis-
crimination claim. 61 The first alleged comment involved his
displeasure about spending the holidays with his family because he
did not "like to be around old people."6 2 In another context, he also
allegedly said that " [e]verybody over 30 years old needs to be put in a
pen. Yeah, if they don't want to be put in a pen, they should be con-
fined to a concentration camp. '63 The admission of these statements
was challenged on appeal as being too prejudicial. But the Sixth Cir-
cuit found that the error, if any, by the trial court in letting the jury
57. Bloggers may also put their jobs at risk because they are operating under the
belief that the First Amendment protects their expressive activity. However, the First
Amendment imposes no restriction on a private employer preventing it from terminating
an employee for his or her expressive conduct. Marshall, supra note 2.
58. The doctrine of "respondeat superior" provides that an employer is liable for an
employee's tort or crime if the employee's acts were within the scope of employment.
Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 586-87 (8th Cir. 2003).
59. 25 F.3d 1325 (6th Cir. 1994).
60. Id. at 1327-29.
61. Id. at 1329.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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hear these two statements was "harmless" since there was other suffi-
cient evidence to support the jury's verdict.64
Similarly, in Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,65 the plaintiff-em-
ployee attempted to use a co-worker's off-duty, verbal, racist state-
ments about African-American women to support her race
discrimination claim. 66 Though the attempt was ultimately unsuccess-
ful, the court stated that if the employer "spoke [the racist statements]
in the workplace or to Hardin's face within the limitations period-
the thrust of this opinion could be markedly different. '67 Although
the cases above both dealt with off-duty verbal statements-as op-
posed to off-duty blog contents-one may reasonably conclude that
the courts could find that statements published in blogs are equally
actionable.
Employers may also fear potential liability for the criminal activi-
ties of their employees. Where a blog discusses political topics and
public figures, an employee can easily engage in libelous statements 68
that create liability for the employer. Online libel, therefore, raises
similar concerns for employers as off-line defamatory statements.
Criminal activities can also affect a business's reputation. For example,
a blogger who provides links to illegal works or pornographic material
could jeopardize the employer's integrity or the employer's relation-
ship with others. 69 This is particularly so where the blogger makes use
of the employer's computers, network, and work time to facilitate
such activities.
An employer may also worry about other behavior that, although
not legally actionable, is bad for business and could hurt the company
or the employer personally.7 0 An employer will worry about the con-
tent of blogs that mention the company, as did Delta Air Lines, Pil-
grim's employer, and the Houston Chronicle in the examples above.
64. Id. at 1332.
65. 167 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 1999).
66. Id. at 343.
67. Id. at 345.
68. Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words,
in physical form, or by any other means of communication, which has the potentially
harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS § 568(1) (1938).
69. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 313-15
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (addressing the online posting of a DVD decryption program, which re-
sulted in a violation of copyright protection for the employer as well as revenue loss).
70. See Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723, 725 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing the ter-
mination of employment for an intern who spoke negatively about her employer in a tele-
vision interview).
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If an employee blogger badmouths clients, the reputation of the com-
pany is more at risk than that of the blogger. The damage to the com-
pany's reputation could be immeasurable where the company bases its
business transactions on confidentiality and an employee-blogger
writes about particular clients. If a blogger badmouths co-workers, the
targeted victims may feel that the blogging has invaded their privacy
or that the work environment as a whole is unfriendly to them. Some
employees may not work as well with others if they fear their every
movement is subject to public scrutiny.
The employer concerns presented above are particularly war-
ranted upon consideration of the easily accessible and permanent na-
ture of Internet content. Because blogs are easily accessible and
searchable, once the blog announces something harmful, retraction is
difficult. While written or oral disclosures may be tracked down and
the recipients sworn to secrecy, data and information on the Internet
are easily searchable. Google, for example, provides a search engine
exclusively for blogs. 7 Each blog site, like Xanga.com, also provides
search engines for the blogs on its servers.
Savvy employers will use this searchability to their advantage. En-
gaging in these simple search techniques can yield a wealth of infor-
mation on a given employee-blogger, information that may prove
useful in assessing the employee's productivity or loyalty. There may
undoubtedly also be a myriad of information useful in assessing the
employee-blogger's personal interests in music, film, and dating, but
irrelevant to business interests. What must not be lost in this discus-
sion are the consequences to the blogger of the employer using this
management tool. An awareness that their employer scours the In-
ternet for employee blogs and takes employment actions based on
such searches may deter employees from engaging in future commu-
nication on the Internet.
An employer's right to manage employees, although justified for
the above reasons, inevitably gives rise to legitimate concerns regard-
ing privacy for the contents of employees's blogs. Not surprisingly, the
interests of employees and employers are inversely proportional to
each other: the greater the privacy right for the employee, the lesser
the managerial right for the employer; conversely, the greater the
managerial right for the employer, the less privacy afforded to the
employee. The law must balance this conflict between the two groups
in an efficient manner and as equitably as possible.
71. Technorati, http://technorati.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
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H. Implementing Employment Protection for the Blogger: A
Solution Proposed to Address Current Failures
The crux of this Comment lies not with simply advocating the
need to recognize an area of privacy to protect employees, but the
means by which to implement law protecting employees from adverse
employment actions. Indeed, the authors cited above have sufficiently
discussed autonomy as protected by privacy, but none have taken the
additional step of demonstrating how to implement this type of pro-
tection in the law.
The most appropriate manner in which to implement this protec-
tion is for the individual states to pass legislation. To this end, this
Comment proposes a model statute to effectuate this purpose. Some
states, notably California, New York, North Dakota, and Colorado,
have actually taken some steps to protect an array of off-duty con-
duct.72 Yet, as this Comment will illustrate, none of these states suffi-
ciently protect the autonomy of the employee-blogger. The states
need to enact legislation that specifically addresses these concerns.
A proposal alone, however, fails to address the type of reform
necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of protecting the employee.
Equally as important is the choice of mechanism in reforming the ex-
isting law, or the lack thereof. Process is a crucial element in deter-
mining outcome. The differences between statutory law and judicially-
created common law and between federal and state law, affect the way
in which a new rule is interpreted, applied, and further amended. To
fully and effectively protect employees against unjust discipline for
lawful off-duty behavior, state legislation will ultimately be necessary.
Before delving into the model statute and the appropriateness of
state legislation to protect the autonomy of private-sector employees, a
brief understanding of the current laws protecting employees is in or-
der. All states, save for one, retain the at-will presumption, in which an
employee can be fired for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at
all. 73 Thus, as a rule of thumb, an employee has no protection for any
off-duty writings, including blogs. This holds true in spite of the mis-
taken belief by many employees that their speech is protected by the
First Amendment's free speech guarantee. 74
72. See discussion infra Part II.B.
73. The statutory law of Montana provides that the at-will relationship has been set
aside in favor of a presumption that employment is for-cause. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-
903, 39-2-904 (2005).
74. First Amendment speech law pertains to the powers of the government, not the
private employer. See Marshall, supra note 2.
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For certain classes of employee bloggers, existing laws provide a
basis for a reasonable expectation of protection. With respect to state
laws, employees can appeal to exceptions to the at-will presumption
for protection of their off-duty blogging.75 Off-duty blogging may also
fall within the scope of protection provided by federal laws, such as:
the National Labor Relations Act 76 (which protects certain employ-
ees's discussions regarding wages, benefits, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment); or federal anti-discrimination statutes,
including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 77 the Americans
with Disabilities Act,78 or the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act 79-all of which prohibit employers from discriminating based on
protected classifications.80 Employers should also ensure that their ac-
tions do not violate state anti-discrimination statutes81 or whistleblow-
ing laws.82 However, none of these legal protections encompass off-
duty conduct as its own category. A blogger who writes about work-
place health benefits may find protection under the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act,83 but the same blogger would find no protection for
writing about the company party.
A. A Model State Statute for Off-Duty Conduct Balancing the
Rights of the Employee and the Employer
The following proposal addresses blogging and many other con-
texts in which employment issues arise with regard to off-duty con-
duct. The proposal is designed to reconcile the tension between
employees's legitimate expectation of privacy and employers's poten-
tial liability.
75. For an extensive discussion on the common law protections relevant to off-duty
blogging, see Gutman, supra note 37.
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17 (2000).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13 (2000).
79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
80. For an extensive discussion on the federal statutory protections relevant to off-
duty conduct in general, see Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Vhat Do You Do When You Are Not at
Work?: Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct As the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 670-77 (2004).
81. See, e.g., California's Fair Employment and Housing Act. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 12900-96 (West 2005) (providing protection for employees from harassment or dis-
crimination that is directed at certain immutable characteristics, including age, sex, race,
and medical condition).
82. See, e.g., California's Whistleblower Protection Statute. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(b)
(West 2003).
83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2000).
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While the following proposal covers blogging and other off-duty
recreational activities, it is not designed to address all contexts in
which employees may be fired for off-duty lifestyle conduct. The stat-
ute (at least in part) should contain the following provision:8 4
1. Unless otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful for an em-
ployer to take adverse employment action against an individual
with regards to terms, conditions, compensation, or privileges of
employment because of lawful conduct by the employee that oc-
curs outside of working hours, off the employer's premises, and
without the use of the employer's equipment or property:
(a) An employee's lawful activity for which the employee receives
no compensation, including, but not limited to, sports, games, hob-
bies, exercise, reading, the viewing of television and movies, or
engaging in Internet communications.
2. The provision enumerated above shall not protect off-duty activ-
ity that:
(a) creates a material conflict of interest with regards to the em-
ployer's trade secret, proprietary information, or business-re-
lated interests; and/or
(b) relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is reason-
ably and rationally related to the employment activities and re-
sponsibilities of a particular employee or a particular group of
employees, rather than to all employees of the employer.
This model lifestyle discrimination statute provides an employee
with the right to engage in lawful off-duty blogging while balancing
the employee's autonomy rights with the employer's business and fi-
duciary interests.
If the Houston Chronicle fired Steve Olafson for his blog within a
jurisdiction that recognizes the model lifestyle statute, the court would
likely uphold the termination as lawful. In doing so, the court would
find Olafson's blog to be in violation of the conflict-of-interest restric-
tion because (1) the blog he wrote directly contradicted what he
wrote for the Chronicle, and (2) the information in the blog came
from sources of the Chronicle. The court would also likely find that
Olafson violated the duty of loyalty inherent in the employee's rela-
tionship with the employer.
Ellen Simonetti's case is slightly more elusive than Olafson's
under the model statute. The court would not likely find that the
"Queen of the Sky" blog she maintained at the time of her firing con-
84. The proposed statute excludes the enforcement mechanism or any particular
remedies afforded the aggrieved complainant, which are beyond the purview of this Com-
ment. Further, the author recognizes the unreasonable nature of passing legislation that
solely addresses blogging, outside the context of other "lifestyle" issues. For this reason, the
model statute addresses lifestyle discrimination in general, including a non-exhaustive list
of lifestyles, such as blogging.
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stituted a conflict of interest since she did not stand to personally gain
from the journal.85 Further, her duties at Delta did not suffer on ac-
count of the blog. A reasonable argument exists, however, that the
provocative pictures she posted of herself inside the cabin of a Delta
airplane were reasonably and rationally related to her particular em-
ployment activities. Thus, depending on the tendencies of the presid-
ing court, the model statute could be applied to protect Simonetti's
employment, while still providing sufficient leeway to deny Simonetti
relief.
Mark Pilgrim is the one employee who the model statute would
seemingly protect. A link from a programming site to his personal
blog that reflected, in one entry, on his past addictions to marijuana
and alcohol would not constitute a fiduciary conflict of interest. An
account of the past hardly impedes the fulfillment of a present job.
Further, Pilgrim stood to gain nothing from that particular journal
entry, at least with regards to his job as a programmer. A past sub-
stance addiction is also not related to a current bona fide employment
requirement for a computer programmer, nor is it reasonably or ra-
tionally related to the job.
The success of the model lifestyle statute lies in (1) its acknowl-
edgement of the new medium of communication through blogs that
the Internet provides, as well as (2) the balance between the legiti-
mate privacy interest of employees and the realistic fiduciary interest
of employers. As previously mentioned, some states have already
passed legislation that addresses some lifestyle-discrimination con-
cerns of private-sector employees.
B. Existing State Statutes and Their Failures to Sufficiently Protect
the Blogger
More than half the states have enacted statutes to protect employ-
ees engaging in lawful off-duty conduct from adverse employment ac-
tions by employers. 86 Such adverse actions by employers have been
coined "lifestyle discrimination."8 7 Yet the vast majority of the lifestyle
discrimination statutes merely protect employees's right to consume
85. On the other hand, Ms. Simonetti has gained plenty, in terms of fame and for-
tune, since Delta terminated her employment. See Diary of a Fired Flight Attendant, Nov.
13, 2006, http://queenofskyjournalspace.com/ (indicating that she has signed copies of
her book on Amazon for $27.95).
86. LITTLER MENDELSON, supra note 5, at 1271.
87. Id.
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lawful products, such as tobacco. 88 In fact, only four states provide a
statutory scheme broadly protecting employees engaging in all lawful
off-duty activities. 89 These states are California, New York, Colorado,
and North Dakota. 90 For the most part, the statutes passed by the leg-
islatures in New York, Colorado, and North Dakota treat lawful off-
duty conduct similarly, balancing employees's privacy rights with em-
ployers's business needs. The only difference between the three lies in
the language the legislatures use to provide an escape clause for
employers.
As for California, the statutory language may give the reader an
impression of broad applicability, but the scope of the law has been
tempered severely by judicial opinion. California's statutes effectually
provide no more than a procedural process for implementing privacy
protections already afforded to its citizens.
1. The Failure of Purely Procedural Instruments: California
In addition to the right to privacy contained in California's state
constitution, 9 1 California has a separate law pertaining to a worker's
right to privacy for off-duty conduct. Under section 96(k) of Califor-
nia's Labor Code, enacted in 2000 as part of the Labor Standards En-
forcement Act, 92 the Labor Commissioner has the responsibility of
handling all "[c] laims for loss of wages as the result of demotion, sus-
pension, or discharge from employment for lawful conduct occurring
during nonworking hours away from the employer's premises."93 Fur-
ther, Labor Code section 98.6(a) provides that "[n]o person shall dis-
charge an employee or in any manner discriminate against any
employee or applicant for employment because the employee or ap-
88. Gely & Bierman, supra note 45, at 1099 (stating that "[i]n the late 1980's the
tobacco industry began aggressively lobbying state legislatures to pass laws protecting the
rights of employees and prospective employees to smoke while off-duty .... In total, over
thirty states have passed legislation protecting the off-duty rights of employee
smokers .... ).
89. LIrLER MENDELSON, supra note 5, at 1271.
90. Id. Though Montana also protects employees for engaging in lawful off-duty activi-
ties, such protection is based not on any specific statute protecting off-duty conduct, but a
general statute eliminating the at-will presumption in Montana. See MoNT. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-2-903, 39-2-904 (2005).
91. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (providing that [a]Ill people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy.").
92. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 77-107 (West 2003).
93. CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003).
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plicant engaged in any conduct delineated in this chapter, including
the conduct described in subdivision (k) of Section 96 . . .94
In 2001, the California Legislature explained that the aforemen-
tioned sections of the labor code provide employees with a necessary,
yet inexpensive, administrative remedy for their pursuit of their
rights. 9 5 The Legislature also declared that the Labor Standards En-
forcement Act furthered the state interest in protecting the rights of
individual employees and job applicants who could not otherwise af-
ford to protect themselves. 96
After its enactment, however, concerns arose about the scope of
section 96(k) and the ramifications for employers in California.9 7
With questions raised about the breadth of section 96(k), the Califor-
nia Attorney General responded by stating that the statute did not
abrogate existing law that prevented peace officers from participating
in off-duty conduct conflicting with their job duties. 98 Although the
Attorney General's response applies directly to public-sector employ-
ees, it contains language that could be construed to extend to private-
sector employees. The opinion states that subsection (k) was added to
section 96 "so that the Commissioner could 'assert the civil rights oth-
erwise guaranteed by Article I of the California Constitution' for employees
'ill-equipped and unduly disadvantaged' to assert such rights."99 The
Attorney General went on to state that the constitutional rights of
peace officers "do not prevent [them] from being disciplined for off-
duty incompatible activities." 100
Moreover, throughout its history, "section 96 has not served as an
original source of employee rights against employers, but has instead
provided a supplemental procedure for asserting employee claims for
which the legal basis already existed elsewhere in the law." 10' This his-
tory led to the conclusion that section 96(k) "did not create new sub-
stantive rights for employees . . . . [I]t established a procedural
mechanism that allows the Commissioner to assert, on behalf of em-
94. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6(a) (West 2003).
95. Labor Standards Enforcement Act, ch. 820, § 1, 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5201
(West).
96. Id.
97. Section 96(k) of the California Labor Code: Implications for Employers Who Attempt to
Regulate Lawful Employee Conduct During Non-Working Hours, THELEN REID & PRIEST LLP,
Report No. 63, June 18, 2002, http://www.thelenreid.com/articles/report/rep63.htm
(describing the potential problems that section 96(k) might cause employers).
98. 83 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 226 (2000).
99. Id. at 228.
100. Id. at 229.
101. Id.
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ployees, their independently recognized constitutional rights." 10 2
Thus, the California Legislature clearly intended for section 96(k) to
provide employees with merely a procedural instrument, rather than a
substantive right, by which they could assert rights already guaranteed
under current California law.
The cases decided in California regarding the scope of section
96(k) have affirmed the interpretation provided by the California At-
torney General. In Barbee v. Household Automotive Finance Corp.,103 an
employer fired a sales manager for dating a co-worker, pursuant to the
company's non-fraternizing policy.10 4 The plaintiff-employee alleged
that because his consensual relationship with his co-worker was lawful
and conducted during nonworking hours, he was protected by section
96(k). 10 5 The appellate court disagreed, stating that section 96 "does
not describe any public policies ... [but] simply outlines the types of
claims over which the Labor Commissioner shall exercise
jurisdiction."'106
The court in Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp.10 7 reached a similar
result for the employer. The plaintiff-employee, a manager, alleged
that the private corporation terminated her employment because of
her membership in "Women's Garden Circle," an investment group
her employer believed to be an illegal pyramid scheme. 0 8 The court
held that section 96(k) provides merely a procedure by which the La-
bor Commissioner exercises jurisdiction, but not any independent ba-
sis for public policy.' 0 9 The court also held that section 98.6 does not
establish public policy against terminations for conduct not protected
under the Labor Code. 10
Thus, in spite of the generous language of sections 96(k) and
98.6(a), California's Labor Code merely provides a procedural supple-
ment to the substantive rights already guaranteed by California's First
Amendment free speech provision. Since that provision applies only
to governmental actions and "expresses no public policy regarding
102. Id. at 230. This opinion served as the basis for rejecting a police officer's argument
that his employer "impermissibly relied on off-duty conduct in terminating his employ-
ment." Paloma v. City of Newark, No. A098022, 2003 WL 122790, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
10, 2003).
103. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406 (Ct. App. 2003).
104. Id. at 408-09.
105. Id. at 412.
106. Id. at 413.
107. 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Ct. App. 2004).
108. Id. at 896.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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terminations by private employers,"''I bloggers in California have no
greater employment protection than their counterparts in the forty-
six other states that lack statutes addressing lifestyle discrimination.
California's laws fail to protect the lifestyle choices made by a private-
sector employee-such as the choice to blog about non-work related
topics-from the possible negative responses of the prying manager.
2. The Failure of Substantive Approaches to Statutory Regulation
of Off-Duty Conduct
a. New York
New York's Recreational Activities Law, 112 section 201-d, states
that an employer may not discharge an individual from employment
or otherwise discriminate against the "individual in compensation,
promotion or terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
of . . . [the] individual's legal recreational activities outside work
hours, off of the employer's premises and without use of the em-
ployer's equipment or other property."' 13 Section 201-d, however, ex-
pressly limits protection to activities that do not "create[ ] a material
conflict of interest related to the employer's trade secrets, proprietary
information or other proprietary or business interest."114 At first
glance, the New York statute seems to broadly protect off-duty lifestyle
choices made by the employee, limiting behavior only to that which is
legal, recreational, and not in material conflict with the employer's
business interests.
Few cases interpret the scope of section 201-d, specifically discuss-
ing the definition of "legal recreational activities." Nearly all of those
cases deal solely with the issue of whether "dating" or "cohabiting"
falls within that definition." 15 Those courts agree that dating does not
111. Id.
112. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (McKinney 2002).
113. Id. §§ 201-d(2) through 201-d(2) (c).
114. See id. § 201-d(3) (a). The law also does not protect certain acts by employees of a
state agency that conflict with their official duties and acts that these employees do which
are in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. See id. §§ 201-d(3) (b) through (e).
115. See, e.g., McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 495 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (holding that employee's dating relationship with a fellow corporate officer was not
a recreational activity); Hudson v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 725 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div.
2001) (deciding that an extramarital affair was not a recreational activity and thus em-
ployee's termination did not violate section 201-d); Bilquin v. Roman Catholic Church, 729
N.Y.S.2d 519 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that cohabitation by a female employee with a man
who is married to another woman is not a recreational activity); State v. Wal-Mart Stores
Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that romantic dating is entirely distinct
from recreational activity).
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fall within the ambit of the law.'1 6 In one case, the court stated that
the legislative history of section 201-d "evinces an obvious intent to
limit the statutory protection to certain clearly defined categories of
leisure-time activities."' 17 Another stated that "one of the primary
motivations [in the enactment of section 201-d] was to protect smok-
ers and users of tobacco products against the extensive vigilantism
which their lawful leisure time recreational activity has invoked in re-
cent years."118 These cases demonstrate the courts's unwillingness to
extend protection for off-duty conduct not expressly contemplated by
the state legislature.
In the only case that discusses interpretation of section 201-d
outside of the dating context, the plaintiff attempted to extend "legal
recreational activities" to include the installation of telephone equip-
ment for personal profit.119 Because the statute states that the term,
"recreational activities," is defined to include "any lawful, leisure-time
activity, for which the employee receives no compensation .... -120 the
court called the argument "patently frivolous."'121 Based on the cases
above, it seems New York courts will not broadly interpret the phrase
"recreational activity" in section 201-d.
No New York case addresses computer usage, or blogging in par-
ticular, with regard to an employee's off-duty conduct. The analysis in
McCavitt seems promising for the blogging employee seeking protec-
tion, since the court made a point to indicate that the New York legis-
lature, in drafting section 201-d, intended to protect lawful leisure
time recreational activities from "extensive vigilantism."2 2 The case
may not be helpful in gaining blogging rights, however, because the
court also explicitly stated that "[h]istory tells us that one of the pri-
mary motivations was to protect smokers and users of tobacco prod-
ucts.' '1 23 Further, the court relied on the fact that "the enactment [of
section 201-d] . . . was accomplished only after revisions to satisfy
lengthy opposition focused on its prospective interference with the
concept of employment at will." 1 24
116. McCavitt, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 498; Hudson, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 319; Bilquin, 729 N.Y.S.2d
at 519; Wal-Mart Stores, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
117. Wal-Mart Stores, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
118. McCavitt, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
119. Cheng v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 64 F. Supp. 2d 280, 285 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
120. N.Y. LAB. LAw § 201-d(1)(b) (McKinney 2002) (emphasis added).
121. Cheng, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 285 n.2.
122. McCavitt, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
123. Id
124. Id
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On the other hand, the plain language of section 201-d addresses
a non-exhaustive list encompassing a myriad of off-duty activities, 125
indicating that the legislature intended for the statute to be inter-
preted broadly. Blogging could possibly fit into the "hobby" category
of the recreational activities protected by the statute. Blogging, for
most purposes, is a hobby, whether created or read by the blogger.
However, given the New York Legislature's proclivity to avoid "inter-
ference with the concept of employment at will,"1 2 6 the courts likely
would not extend the reach of "hobby" to authoring and publishing
blogs. The courts would probably treat blogging as "television, movies,
and similar materials," thereby protecting only the reading and view-
ing of blogs. Since the protection sought is for the writing of a blog,
such a characterization would prove detrimental to the blogger's
rights. Further, depending on how loosely the judiciary will interpret
section 201-d(3) and the phrase "material conflict of interest related
to the ... business interest,"127 blogging can receive as much, that is,
as little, protection as it currently does under the at-will regime.
Section 201-d is a well-written and broadly-worded statute. Yet the
New York statute ultimately lacks any reference to the technological
advances that have given rise to the blog. Ten years ago, the blogo-
sphere was no more than a niche group of technologically-savvy indi-
viduals, for whom broad statutory protection would not have been
reasonable. Today, the blogosphere has millions of participants. It is a
completely new space for communication that is used extensively by
employee and employer alike. For this very reason, the blogger's uni-
verse of privacy from the employer has shrunk. For the New York stat-
ute to remain current with the ever changing landscape of electronic
communication and its privacy implications, it must be revised to ad-
dress these very concerns.
b. Colorado
The Colorado statute, section 24-34-402.5, provides that " [i] t shall
be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for an employer to
terminate the employment of any employee due to that employee's
engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during
125. "'Recreational activities' shall mean any lawful, leisure-time activity, for which the
employee receives no compensation and which is generally engaged in for recreational
purposes, including but not limited to sports, games, hobbies, exercise, reading and the
viewing of television, movies and similar materials." N.Y. LAB. LAw § 201-d(1) (b) (McKin-
ney 2002).
126. McCavitt, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
127. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(3) (a).
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nonworking hours."' 28 The statute contains two exceptions for the
employer to lawfully terminate the employment of an individual based
on off-duty activities. First, the employer may lawfully terminate the
employment of an individual whose off-duty conduct "[r] elates to a
bona fide occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally re-
lated to the employment activities and responsibilities of a particular
employee . . . rather than to all employees of the employer."1 29 Sec-
ond, termination is lawful where it "[i] s necessary to avoid a conflict of
interest with any responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of
such a conflict of interest.'
3 0
Though the general rule may be similar to that in New York, the
exceptions to the rule that weigh in favor of the employer are strik-
ingly different. The Colorado statute, in contrast to the New York stat-
ute, gives the employer greater leeway in justifying termination of an
employee for off-duty conduct. The conflict of interest need not be
"material" as in New York. In fact, no conflict of interest is necessary in
Colorado at all. There merely needs to be an appearance of a conflict of
interest.
Though no court in Colorado has addressed section 24-34-402.5
in the blogging context, the courts have, interestingly enough, con-
strued the statute quite broadly in other contexts. In Gwin v. Chesrown
Chevrolet,13 1 the appellate court affirmed a jury verdict for an em-
ployee fired by Chesrown's general manager. 3 2 The termination of
employment occurred as a result of the employee's voluntary partici-
pation in a sales seminar and his subsequent demand for a refund of
the cost of attending the seminar.133 Though the employer involved
itself by paying one-half of the seminar price,134 the court found that
the employer did not fire Gwin for attending the seminar but for de-
manding a refund from the motivational speaker.1 3 5 In spite of the
employer's fiduciary involvement in the seminar, the court liberally
found that the employee's off-duty conduct at the seminar, i.e., de-
128. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2006).
129. Id. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a).
130. Id. § 24-34-402.5(1) (b) (emphasis added).
131. 931 P.2d 466 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
132. Id. at 468.
133. Id. at 466.
134. Id. at 468.
135. Id. at 470 (noting that the plaintiff demanded the refund from the speaker pursu-
ant to the speaker's guarantee of satisfaction).
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manding a refund from the motivational speaker, was not "reasonably
related to [the employee's] employment."13 6
Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.137 best illustrates the Colorado
courts's willingness to construe section 24-34-402.5 in favor of the em-
ployee by limiting the reach of its exceptions. In Marsh, a baggage
handler for Delta Air Lines wrote a disparaging letter about his em-
ployer to the editor of the Denver Post.' 38 After the letter was pub-
lished, Delta fired the baggage handler. 139 The district court
ultimately upheld the termination by Delta as lawful, 140 but it did not
do so because of any conflict of interest or appearance thereof.1 4 1 The
court held that the statutory term, conflict of interest, relates only "to
fiduciaries and their relationship to matters of private interest or gain to
them or a situation in which regard for one duty tends to lead to disre-
gard of another."142 The court stated that the plaintiff did not disre-
gard his duties in favor of personal gain by writing the disparaging
letter to the newspaper, nor did he seek any personal gain.1 43 Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that the baggage handler negatively por-
trayed his employer in a public forum, the court nevertheless found
that his actions failed to amount to any conflict of interest with Delta
or even an appearance of a conflict of interest.
As mentioned above, no Colorado case involving section 24-34-
402.5 has addressed the termination of employment based on blog-
ging. Based on the opinions above, however, an online blog would
likely constitute a lawful activity as contemplated by the drafters of the
Colorado statute. If an employee in Colorado were to write a disparag-
ing entry about his or her employer on an online blog, the Colorado
courts would not likely find such behavior to constitute a conflict of
interest.144
However, simply because the Colorado courts have been willing
to liberally construe the language of its lifestyle discrimination statute
does not necessarily mean that the statute itself is written in the most
136. Id. at 471.
137. 952 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1997).
138. Id. at 1460.
139. Id. at 1461.
140. Id. at 1463 (holding that section 24-34-402.5 encompasses an implied duty of loy-
alty, which the employee breached by writing the disparaging letter to the newspaper).
141. Id. at 1464.
142. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted).
143. Id.
144. However, the blog would probably amount to a breach of the duty of loyalty to the
employer, for which termination would be lawful under section 24-34-402.5, in spite of the
lawful nature of the conduct.
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effective manner. For example, New York courts, given their tendency
to avoid confrontation with the employment at-will doctrine, would
likely interpret the Colorado statute to encompass fewer lifestyle deci-
sions than do Colorado's own courts. Specifically, the exception, "nec-
essary to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest," is so vague
that a court could reasonably do away with the general rule by focus-
ing on the language of this exception. While protecting the em-
ployer's business interests is necessary, such protection must be better
balanced to also reflect protection for the employee's right to privacy.
This protection can be found in the language of the model statute
proposed above.
c. North Dakota
North Dakota's Human Rights Act, 145 section 14-02.4-01, enacted
in 1991, establishes the protection of "lawful activity" during non-work
hours and away from work premises. 146 This protection is incorpo-
rated directly into the state's law prohibiting other forms of employ-
ment discrimination, such as those based on race, national origin, and
sex. It prohibits "discrimination on the basis of... participation in
lawful activity off the employer's premises during nonworking hours
which is not in direct conflict with the essential business-related inter-
ests of the employer."1 47 Based on the language alone, the Human
Rights Act is similar to that of New York, the only difference being
that a court in North Dakota would look for a "direct conflict" rather
than a "material conflict" and an "essential business-related interest"
rather than activity merely "related to the employer's . . . business
interest."148
No court in North Dakota, to date, has contemplated blogging
and termination with regards to the Human Rights Act. Yet it seems
unlikely that blogging would be protected. The court in Hougum v.
Valley Memorial Homes149 stated that the legislature did not design the
statute to protect an employee's off-duty conduct that is "deleterious
to the well-being of the employer's mission."150 In fact, in 1993, two
years after the passage of section 14-02.4-01, the North Dakota Legisla-
ture passed legislation to also exclude protection for an employee's
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2004).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.; N.Y. LAB. LAw § 201-d(3) (a) (McKinney 2002).
149. 574 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1998).
150. Id. at 821 (internal quotation omitted).
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off-duty conduct "if that participation is contrary to a bona fide occu-
pational qualification that reasonably and rationally relates to employ-
ment activities and the responsibilities of a particular employee.' 15 1
The language above mirrors that of Colorado's off-duty statute. It
was this very language that was the source of litigation in Fatland v.
Quaker State Corp.152 In that case, the employer fired Fatland after find-
ing out that he continued to have ownership interest in a competitor
of Quaker State, in direct violation of company policy. 153 The court
found that the employer had a legitimate conflict of interest concern
because the competitor would benefit from confidential information
that the employee could secure for the competitor. 54
In Hougum, the court discussed the scope of the term, "essential
business-related interest," as found in the Human Rights Act. In the
case, the employer, a Christian, non-profit nursing home organiza-
tion,1 55 fired its chaplain for masturbating in the bathroom stall of a
department store.' 56 The employer asserted that Hougum's actions
"undermined his effectiveness as a chaplain and therefore directly
conflicted with its business-related interests."1 5 7 However, the court
stated that the issue is "not the same type of business and economic
conflicts of interest at stake in Fatland"5 8 and "decline [d] to hold, as a
matter of law, . . [that] Hougum's activity was in direct conflict with
[the employer's] essential business-related interests."' 59
Based on the cases above, a blogger may find protection for his or
her online journal in a number of circumstances. If brought before a
North Dakota court, the Houston Chronicle's firing of Steve Olafson
would likely be found lawful because his online blog constituted com-
petition, and his personal use of newspaper information for the blog
would be an essential business-related interest. On the other hand,
Mark Pilgrim's firing for maintaining a blog on which he posted an
essay about his past addictions would most likely be found unlawful
because such addictions are "not the same type of business and eco-
nomic conflicts of interest at stake in Fatland,"60 especially since Pil-
151. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-08.
152. 62 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 1995).
153. Id. at 1072.
154. Id. at 1072-73.
155. Valley Memorial Homes, http://www.valleymemorial.org/vmhistory.cfm (last vis-
ited Jan. 18, 2007).
156. Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 815 (N.D. 1998).
157. Id. at 822.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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grim was a computer programmer by trade. Ultimately, in spite of the
tendencies of the North Dakota judicial system, the statute remains
vague enough for a conservative court to find that the law either does
not apply or is excluded from the blogging context.
The statutes enumerated above demonstrate that while some
states have been willing to broadly construe existing lifestyle discrimi-
nation statutes, the statutes themselves have inadequately addressed
the issues raised by emerging technology. New York's Legal Recrea-
tional Activities Law addresses many specific activities that are pro-
tected yet fails to protect online communications like blogging. Other
statutes, like those in Colorado and North Dakota, fail to address any
specific activities. As a result, those statutes provide loopholes for em-
ployers and judges to deny relief to employees seeking privacy protec-
tion for their blogs.
C. State Legislatures Should Enact Employment Law Regulating
Blogging
This Comment has focused on a model for state legislation and
the failures of existing legislation to protect off-duty lifestyle conduct,
such as blogging. Missing from the discussion thus far, however, is a
rationale for relying on state legislation to address these privacy needs,
rather than relying on the common law or even federal legislation.
1. Legislative Reform Would Most Appropriately Address Blogging
The type and scope of laws that a court makes differ significantly
from those created by legislation. Even if both institutions implement
identical changes, the very fact that the rule appears in legislation
rather than the common law affects the way the new rule is later ap-
plied and further amended. In this way, legislative reform addressing
off-duty blogging offers advantages lacking in the common law
process.
First, the development of the common law is slow and incremen-
tal compared to legislation. 161 It also does not have the newsworthi-
ness of legislation.162 Two significant advantages offered by legislation
are its relative ease of reference and the publicity that precedes its
enactment. The debate over immigration reform in the spring of 2006
illustrates this point. Not a single day passed in March and April of
161. William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69
BROOK. L. REv. 91, 98 (2003).
162. Id.
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2006 without news about immigration protests and responses, or lack
thereof, by Congress. 163
Moreover, a legislative measure suits changes to lifestyle discrimi-
nation 164 laws better than ajudicial mandate because there is no basis
for which a court would have the authority to carve out an at-will ex-
ception for blogging. Changes to the common law begin from founda-
tional principles and proceed by legal reasoning. Judges typically do
not invent legal doctrine out of thin air that distorts or fails to extend
accepted legal principles. No court has created an exception to the at-
will regime for off-duty conduct pertaining to a "lifestyle"; courts have
merely interpreted existing statutory laws to expand or limit the reach
of an employer's ability to discriminate based on a lifestyle. Changes
in the law that do not logically relate to existing common law princi-
ples are the province of the legislature. A court in Arizona would be
hard pressed to apply the legislative intent for the passage of the pri-
vacy lifestyle statute in New York as the basis for carving a lifestyle
exception to the at-will presumption. The Arizona state legislature, on
the other hand, has no legal obstacle to enacting such a law, using the
statutes from Colorado, New York, and North Dakota, or the statute
proposed herein as models.
Legal reform from the judiciary is unlike new legislation because
there is no guarantee that the changes a judge wishes to make would
fit into existing common law paradigms. Because judges consider one
case at a time, case-specific, non-transferable law can result from a de-
cision in a difficult or atypical case. Conversely, statutes tend to be
drafted from a broader perspective. Legislatures can enact an employ-
ment-related law encompassing all off-duty lifestyles, including excep-
tions considering business interests. A legal legislative framework,
163. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Employers Gird for Immigrant Boycott Today, N.Y. TIMES ON-
LINE, May 1, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/01/us/Olimmig.html?ex=13041360
00&en=lld43b5ae9bOcO9&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; Immigration Issue Draws
Thousands into Streets, MSNBC NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 25, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/11442705/; Students Leave Class to Protest Immigration Bills in Congress, WASH. POST ON-
LINE, Mar. 28, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/
27/AR2006032701370.html; Thousands March for Immigrant Rights, CNN.coM NEWS, May 1,
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/01/immigrant.day/index.html; Ian Shapira &
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, After Immigration Protests, Goal Remains Elusive, N.Y. TIMES ONLINE, May
3, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/03/us/O3assess.html?ex=1304308800&en=2e
64ea34b5de7649&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
164. LITTLER MENDELSON, supra note 5, at 1271 (defining lifestyle discrimination as an
adverse employment action against the employee by the employer for engaging in lawful
off-duty conduct).
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which as a whole works together to achieve economic and social goals,
would better serve the needs of both the employee and the employer.
Finally, a new statute "could pick and choose across a broad spec-
trum of possible enforcement devices."1 65 Given the fact that the
courts are regarded generally as "too formal, too costly, and already
overloaded," 166 in drafting the law, the legislature could choose an
existing administrative agency, such as the California Department of
Fair Employment and Housing, to enforce the legislative mandate. Re-
ferring to the existing governmental apparatus and climate of employ-
ment relations of each state would yield the most efficient manner in
which the legislature could effectuate such a remedy. 167 On the other
hand, the judiciary has no capacity to construct an administrative ap-
paratus for purposes of enforcement. Courts could do no more than
simply defer future enforcement to the courts within its own
jurisdiction.
2. The Superiority of Legislation by the State over the Federal
Government
Until the 1960s, the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair
Labor Standards Act 168 were the only two federal statutes regulating
the workplace.169 Since then, however, Congress has adopted a host of
employment-related statutes, which can be thematically categorized
into two general types of actions: (1) the prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of certain protected characteristics; and (2) the establish-
ment of minimum workplace requirements. 170 Under the first cate-
gory, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the American
with Disabilities Act. Under the second category, Congress enacted
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970171 ("OSHA"), the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,172 the Family and
165. Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward
Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 77 (1988). Though a proposal for any particular enforce-
ment mechanism is beyond the scope of this Comment, the ability of a legislature to draft
such a provision makes it preferable compared to the common law.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000).
169. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review
and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REv. 351, 378 (2002).
170. Id.
171. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2000).
172. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
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Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), and the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act 73.174
Enactment of a statute for the protection of a "lifestyle," i.e., blog-
ging, does not fit into either of these categories. Statutes that provide
protection under the first category cover individuals not as workers,
but either as members of a particular group or on the basis of a speci-
fied protected trait. Federal action, under the first category, is limited
to prohibiting job discrimination only on the specified bases of race,
sex, religion, national origin, age, and the like.175 To protect an off-
duty blogger is to differentiate between an individual's conduct dur-
ing and away from work, rather than between any particular trait that
remains constant whether at work or at home. There is simply no justi-
fication for a law protecting off-duty blogging through the prohibition
of discrimination on the basis of certain protected characteristics.
Protecting the off-duty blogger under the second category would
also controvert congressional intent to limit protection to workplace
standards. Off-duty conduct by its very nature is unrelated to the work-
place; to clump a statute protecting particular off-duty conduct with
OSHA or FMLA would be completely arbitrary.
Moreover, state legislation appears more promising since four
states-California, Colorado, North Dakota, and New York-have al-
ready enacted laws to address off-duty conduct. 176 Further, state legis-
latures have the inherent flexibility of experimenting with alternative
procedures, which Congress may not have because it must address the
needs of the entire country rather than just those of one state. 177
States have the luxury of experimenting with different enforcement
regimes, be it the court or an administrative agency, based on the
needs of the particular state. States also have the flexibility of tailoring
restrictions to the protection for lawful off-duty conduct, pursuant to
the needs of its citizens and legislatures alike. For example, the state
of Louisiana could specifically protect off-duty membership in a hurri-
cane-relief organization-protection that would probably pertain less
to citizens of North Dakota.
In addition, leaving the protection of employees's privacy rights
to the states has affirmative benefits over and above what a national
173. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (2000).
174. Befort, supra note 169, at 380.
175. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
176. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)
(2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2004); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (b)-(d) (McKinney
2002).
177. St. Antoine, supra note 165, at 71.
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standard could offer. Federalism allows states to use their laws to com-
pete for businesses and workers. The states that have the most effi-
cient mix of legal rights and duties will attract the right mix of
businesses and workers. If a state's law is too protective of workers,
companies will locate elsewhere. If a state's law is too protective of
businesses, workers will relocate. This argument suggests that rules
produced by this interplay are more likely to be efficient than rules
promulgated by a nationwide regulatory regime.
Conclusion
Legitimate business-related reasons exist for which an employer
may fire an employee for off-duty blogging. However, employees
should have the right to enjoy privacy that supports and cultivates
their lifestyle choices and the right to autonomously engage in off-
duty lawful conduct so long as it does not interfere with their em-
ployer's legitimate business interests.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "differences in
the characteristics of new mediajustify differences in the First Amend-
ment standards applied to them."1 78 This Comment does not go so far
as to advocate a change in the traditional interpretations of the First
Amendment or a constitutional right to privacy for bloggers. But with
the understanding that blogs constitute a "new media" by which mil-
lions of people communicate, this Comment proposes a model statute
that provides privacy protection for employees that state legislatures
should effectuate. States have always been the primary purveyors of
employment-related laws, save for the niche laws that prohibit discrim-
ination on the basis of membership in a protected class or establish
minimum workplace requirements. Lifestyle discrimination, or, more
specifically, discrimination based on blogging, fits into neither cate-
gory of laws. A statute, moreover, gives the legislature flexibility to ad-
dress the broad concern of lifestyle discrimination-rather than one
aspect therein-and choices between alternative enforcement mecha-
nisms. Given the increasing popularity of communicating through
blogs, the number of adverse employment actions based on those
blogs will only rise. A corresponding rise in the protection for such
communication in the employment arena should follow suit.
178. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
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